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FIRST DAY 
VIP,GIIHA BOARD OF BAR r;;c.A;.1rmr-s 
Richmond, Vir~inia - February 22, 1977 
SECTIOll o~m 
1. Plaintiff filed an action a0ainst )efen~ant seekin8 re-
covery of $500 compensatory and $2000 punitive danar,es resulting 
from an incident in which Defendant discharp:ed a shotp;un toward the 
Plaintiff's residence causing daMage to its exterior. Plaintiff 
alleged that :· sai<l aiming and firinp of said shotpun was done ·will-
fully, unlawfully, violently, and maliciously with the obvious and 
intentional purpose of damar,ing the real property anJ thereby 
causing Plaintiff to feel thereafter fri~htened, oppressed, and 
inti111idated. 11 Defendant filed grounds of defense in which he denied 
each allegation of the motion for judswent. 
Thereafter Plaintiff was deposed on oral exanination, and filed 
a bill of particulars which listed the dampifes to the hor'.1e anc1 costs 
of the re~airs thereto. The evidence developed durinr the course of 
rliscovery indicated that the parties were on friendly terr1s prior to 
the shooting incident. 
At a pretrial conference Defendant admitted liability for the 
property daP.lage in the ar'lount of $.500. Defendant n1oveC. that sur;:r1ary 
jud?.rnent be entered for the Plaintiff in that amount for compensatory 
damap;es and tl.1at the clait1 for punitive J.ar:1ages be denied. The 
Plaintiff opposed the entry of summary judgw.ent for the Defendant 
for punitive damages on the following r,rounds: 
(a) The evidence upon the issue of punitive damares was not 
fully developed durin~ the pretrial procedure and a material issue 
of fact was genuinely in dispute; and 
(b) Summary judgment should not be "base<l in whole or in part 
upon the discovery depositions. 
How should the Court rule on each of the foregoing? 
2. For a personal loan made to him by 0ewey Dimv1it, Shelton 
Shyster executed and deliver~d his unsealed ~500 negotiable note 
dated July 1, 1970, and payable to the order of Dimwit on demand. 
The parties were rood friends and six years went by with no demand 
for pay~ent by Dimwit. Thereafter, the parties had a falling out 
as a result of a political election. When Shyster declined to pay 
the note upon demand on i.lovembcr 1, 1976, Dim1it prom-gtly instituted 
an action at law ap:ainst hin on the note in the Circuit Court of 
Ro:rnol:::e County. In his r-rounds of defense Shyster alleged that the 
action was barred by the applicable sta.tute of lir-01itations. 
(a) t-fuat is the applicable statute of limitations? 
(b) Is the statute a good defense? 
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3. Bif Business, a ~Jew York corporation with its principal 
place of business in the rastern District of ~Torth Carolina, had 
duly qualified and was doing business in the Western District of 
Virg:inia. Big Business was indebted on unliquidated claims to Jones, 
a Virginia citizen residing in the Western District thereof, and to 
Smith, a i1orth Carolina citizen residinp: in the Lastern District 
thereof. In compromise of the unliquidated claim that each had 
against Big Business, Big Business delivered to Jones its note for 
$15,000 payable to him and delivered to Smith its note for $15,000 
payable to hin. Hhen the notes were not paid 1.-vhen they became due, 
separate actions were instituted ar-ainst 3ig Business by (1) Jones 
in the United States District Court for the Uestern District of 
Virginia and by (2) Smith in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of i1orth Carolina. The Defen<lar.t moved to di.smiss 
each action for lack of jurisdiction. 
(a) How should the Court rule on the motion filed in the 
action instituted by Jones? 
(b) How should the Co~rt rule on the motion filed in the 
action instituted by Smith? 
4. John Bennett was charged with involuntary manslaughter for 
the hip;hway traffic death of a pedestrian which occurred on P.oute 
460 in Buchanan County, Virginia. The case was tried before a jury 
in the Circuit Court of that County. At the conclusion of the 
evidence, counsel for Bennett asked the court to instruct the jury 
that it could find him guilty of reckless drivinr. rather than involun· 
tary manslaughter. The court refused to ?-ive the requested instruc-
tion. The jury found Bennett guilty and fixed his punishment at 12 
YTJ.onths in jail and a fine of O 500 with the recor.Dendation that six 
of the t·welve months be suspended for mitiratinr.: circumstances. 
The court ignored the recomnendation and, wit~out reinstructing 
the jury or seekin8 clarification of the punish!11ent, sentenced 
Bennett to 12 months in the county jail and the ?ayment of a $500 
fine. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Vireinia, Bennett assigned as 
error the action of the trial court: 
. (a) In refusinp.; to instruct the jury as requested on the 
lesser-included offense of reckless driving, and 
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(b) In refusing to consider the jury's recomnenclation that a 
portion of his sentence be suspended. 
How ought the Supreme Court to rule on each of these assignments? 
5. On !''!arch 3, 1?75, ~1ary Raynond, a Piel.ow·, executed a deed 
conveying a tract of 25 acres of extremely valuable land in Chester-
field County to her son, Douglas ~~c::.ymond. 
The only other descendant of Jlary Raymond was Charles r:~aymond, 
a zrandson, and only child of Earrison Raynond, a deceased son. 
On August 20, 1975, Charles P.aymonci filed his bill of co!"lplaint 
a~Ainst Douglas Raymond, allegin~ that I~ry ~aymond was without 
sufficient Mental capacity to e:cecutc the 'deet! for the 25 acres of 
land and praying that the deed be rescinded arid set aside. 
Douglas P.aymond duly filed his ans·Fer to the bill of complaint, 
<lenyinf its nllegations. After hearing the evidence ore tenus upon 
the issue thus joined, the Chancellor found that tiary ~aymond lacked 
sufficient mental capacity to execute the deed, and by final decree 
ordered that it be set aside.· 
Douglas Raymond sought and ·uas granted an aprieal by the Supreme 
Court of Virrinia. At'lonrr the errors assi1:ned to the Chancellor's 
decree, ·was one that fiary Raymond was a necessary party and had not 
been joined as a party to the suit. 
Charles Rayl'!lond arp:ued that ~rary Kaymond w·as not a necessary 
party and furthermore, since no objection had been made to her oPis-
sion as a party in the trial court, this assir,nt'lert of error came 
too late.· -
(a) ~as Mary Raymond a necessary party in the suit to set 
aside her deed to Dour.las Raynond? 
(b) Should the Suprcne Court of Virginia consider Doup-las 
Raynond's assie:nl'lent of error upon this ground when he made no objec-
tion to the omission in the trial court? 
Pape Four 
6. Joe Trainer was employed by James Sanders to ElB.nage the 
latt~r's stable of thoroughbred horses. Fis cuties were to SU'f)ervise 
the training, exercisinr, and feeding of the Sanders horses. 
Clay Cooper, a friend of Trainer's, acquired a very promising 
thoroughbred .colt but was ·without facilities to stable or care for it. 
Cooper went to see Trainer at the Sanders stables and noted that 
there was an empty stall and an abundance of hay and oats in the feed 
roan. Coo]!er asked Trainer if he r:\i~ht r.ake arrangements with 11r. 
Sanders to stable and feed his colt for a period of six months. 
Althoueh Trainer had no authority to do so, he ~.ssured Cooper that 
Sanders would stable and feed Cooper's colt for a 9eriod of six months 
at a cost of $75 per month, payable at the end of each ~onth. 
Cooper ir .. unediately brought his colt to the San iers stable V-'here 
it ·was placed in the vacant stall. The follmdng day Sanders came 
by his stable and noticed the colt in the vacant stall. Upon inquiry, 
Trainer told Sanders that the colt belon.~ed to Cooper and that he 
had contracted in Sanders' behalf to Drovide the colt with a stall 
and feed at the price of $75 per month for a period of six months., 
Three weeks later, Sanders called Cooper on the telephone and 
tried to buy the colt at a price of $1,000. Coo9er informed Sanders 
that the colt was not for sale but that he ap~reciated Sanders' 
willingness to board the colt.for six months as this would Eive him 
an opi)ortunity to build a stable of his cvm. Sanders then informed 
Cooper that Trainer was without authority to make the agreenent in 
his behalf to board the colt, and that it must be removed from his 
stable immediately. This disturbed Cooper ~reatly since the weather 
had become very severe and he had no other place where he could be 
assured that the colt would be properly cared for. Cooper consults 
you and seeks your advice as to whether he can be compelled to remove 
the colt from Sanders' stable. -
Hh.at should you advise? 
7. On March 3, 1976, Samuel Sanford leased to .John Thomas all 
the coal underlyin~ a 59-acre tract of land situ.ate in Dickenson 
County, at a royalty of fifty cents per ton, payable monthly. 
Amoug other provisions, the lease containea the following: 
"It is agreed that this lease shall commence from this date 
and continue so long as the party of the second part continues 
to mine and remove coal from the leased prer:1ises; provided 
that the party of the second part shall commence __ to operate 
within four (4) ~onths from this date and continue to mine 
and rer.1ove coal from the leased premises. Should the minin~ 
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and reBoval of coal from the leased premises be discon-
tinued or not performed and operated for a period of 
thirty (30) days, except for disruption due to labor 
disputes, strikes and other work shut-downs beyond his 
control, then this lease shall terminate and be void. 
"It is further mutually agreed between the parties hereto 
that the party of the second part shall have ninety (9~) 
days in which to remove all of his equipment, nining 
machinery and other property which he may have placed 
upon said prenises after the termination, expiration or 
cancellation of this lease." 
Following execution, Thomas placed upon the leased premises 20 
tons of steel rails, 100 wooden cross-ties, and 4 steel mining cars. 
As mining progressed, Thomas used the steel rails and T11ooden cross-
ties to build a track into the mine over ·Hhich he ran the Mininr;.: 
cars for the purpose of hauline; the coal f'rori.1 inside the mine to the 
loadin~ facility on the outside. This track was moved from place to 
place in the mine as the mininr progressed. Ti1e mining contiriued 
until April 30, 1976, ·when Thomas closed dov111 the mine. When Thomas 
failed to resume his mininr: by June 1, Sanford leased the property 
to Lewis Earls, '~o took possession of the mine and the equipment 
placed on the premises by ThoMas, and began mining the coal from the 
prenises. 
On October 1, John 7homas went upon thP. premises with trucks and 
a cre't-7 of workmen to disri.antle the track and remove the steel rails' 
'l;~Tooden cross-ties and mine cars r;1hich he had placed on the property. 
Earls refused to pernit Thanas to remove the equipMent. 
John Thomas then brought an action in detinue against ~arls and 
Sanford to recover the steel rails, ·wooc:en cross-ties and mine cars. 
Earls and Sanford filed their p:rounds of defense assertins that these 
ite~s of mining equipment and machinery ~ere traJe fixtures and that 
title thereto passed to Sanford when Thomas failed to rei:n.ove the 
same fron t~e premises within 90 days after he stopped his nininr 
operation. 
The parties stiµulated the foregoing facts and submitted the 
ca~e to the Court for decision as to who uas entitled to possession 
of the equipment and machinery in question. 
lfuat should be the rulinr of the Court? 
Paa;e Six 
8. In 1974, Creditor sued Pusband and obtained judsment 
against hi::i in the amount of $5,000 which was uncollectable becnuse 
Husband was insolvent. In 1975, Realtor conveyed grocery store 
property to 'Jife for $30, 000, payable by a down payment of ~l, 000 
and the balance, secured by a deed of trust, to be paid in monthly 
installments over a period of twenty years. Wife assured Realtor 
that the un:>aid balance could be repaid from the proceeds of the 
oy>eration of the r.rocery store. T~1~ store was Of)erated by husband 
as agent for the ~Jife but I:usband received no compensation for these 
services. Creditor then brought suit to subject the r;rocery store 
to the lien of his judpI:lent alleging that placeuent of the property 
in l~fe's name was done with intent to defraud Creditor and the court 
should treat the property as if it belon~ed to Husband and was 
purchased with his funds. 
At the trial, the evidence established that the Hife had 
accumulated $1, 000 in her o-vm na'{Yle whic:i s.he used as do-wn payment for 
the grocery store. She had no previous experience in operatinf a 
store and Husband controlled the store raanap;eP1ent completely. The, 
store operation was profitable with all net proceeds payable to Uife 
who used a '.?Ortion to make the payments due o;. t~1e deed of trust 
note and she used the remainder for family subsistence. 
Under the circumstanc,2s of this case should Creditor prevail 
in his suit? 
9. After years of squabbling and counter accusations, I1ot~1er 
and Father Jones separated and filed cross-bills for divorce. They 
acrPed that during the pendency of the suit it would be best for 
their eisht year old son, Hozo, to stay uith Good Friend and her 
husband, 'Who were childless, had a good stable llot:!e and were very 
fond of Bozo who reciprocated their affection. i:ach parent sour.ht 
custody of Bozo in the divorce proceedings, but rrother Jones also 
contended that if she couldn't have custody of the child, then he 
should be placed ~1ith Good Friend and her husband. 
The divorce suit culminated in a decree containing factual 
findinr;s that l~other r·~as unfit to have custody of Eozo by reason 
of mental instability and alcohol addiction; that Good Friend and 
her husband were fit, to have custody of I',ozo an<l would be pleased 
to have pernanent custocly of him; that Father was also fit to have 
custody of :Sozo; and that 73ozo was hapriy when he was with Good Friend 
and her husband or with eit~v:,r i!other or Father but not ~'hen {•e was 
with both T.Iother and Father. On these findings, the trial court 
awarded a divorce to Father and av:arded custody of Bozo to Father. 
Mother appealed, contending she should have been awar~fed custody of 
Bozo as he was happy with her and she was entitled to a presumption 
of fitness, but in the event t~e Court r;ould not eive her custody of 
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!3ozo, then the child s!:loulr! be placed with Good Friend and her 
husband. 
Ifow should the Supreme Court of Virp:inia rule on ~1other' s 
. appeal? ) ? .. ,,... h: v .~, . -, : ~,) )..,, .. ,'·).'/ 
. ,. .. . . . .. ._, . 
10. Contractor agreed to build a home for Owner at an agreed 
price. Or·mer was particularly desirous of having Luml1erman supply 
the luraber and mill work to be used in the house, but Lumberman 
refused to supply the materials unless O\·mer ap,reed to pay Lumb.zrr.i.an 
directly at the end of the job. Accordingly, Con.tractor and Owner 
entered into an agreement by ·which Ovm~r ·would nake periodic payments 
to Contractor during the course of the work but would hold back 
funds sufficient to meet the periodic statem8nts of Lumberman and 
at the completion of the job, Owner would.issue a check, payable 
jointly to Contractor and Lunberman in the total amount of Lumb2rr.:1an' s 
an~rer;ate invoices. A copy of this agreer:-,ent ·was given to Lurr1her!'1.an 
and in reliance thereon he furnished the lumber and millwor'~ as neecled 
to complete the work. 
Hhen the house was completed, Lumberman mar:2 demanJ upon Oi:·mer 
and Contractor for his money, but o~,.mer refused to pay because 
three mechanic's liens had been filed apainst the property by other 
subcontractors. -
Lumberman thereupon filed an action at law against 01,mer 
d~P!anding judgment for the a~0regate anount of his invoipes. 
1 
Owner 
filed grounds of defense alleging that he was a mere staKeholaer of 
the funds which he held; that the Court should or<l•=r the subcon-
tractor mechanic lienors to be interpleaded in the action; and that 
the Court should then direct Owner in the ·.Jrooer distribution of 
funds. · · 
Lumberman then moved the Court to strike out Owner's prayer 
that the fil.echanic lienors be interpleaded, and to find that Lumber-
man was entitled to the funds held by Oi;mer. 
IIow should the Courtrnle on Lumberman's motion? 
